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Abstract: It is recognized that the global financial crisis, with its immediate influences, has led to 
major changes in the central banks’ policy, but that longer-term effects have still put monetary policy 
strategies on important challenges related to the way in which they can be adapted to the post-crisis 
environment. This article aims at identifying options for the monetary policy strategy in the future, 
starting from highlighting the post-crisis adjustments of central banks’ monetary policy. To this end, 
we apply the comparative analysis between central banks, both from developed countries and 
emerging ones. The results shows that although there is not a valid universal solution, the monetary 
policy strategies can be adjusted taking into account the features of both the forecast-inflation 
targeting strategy and the integrated inflation targeting strategy. The latter one implies to explicitly 
extend the central bank’s responsibility by including the financial stability objective into the monetary 
policy strategy. 
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1. Introduction 
The post-crisis period is marked by numerous challenges for macroeconomic 
policies, including for monetary policy. The frequent turbulences in the financial 
market, with their effects on the risk perception of the market participants (Lupu et 
al., 2016), uncertainties regarding the effects of the non-standard monetary 
measures, or those regarding macroeconomic perspectives, including the fear of 
deflation, represent at least so many challenges for the monetary policy of central 
banks. They are the effect of deeper imbalances reflected not only  by the severity 
of the recession period after the global financial crisis and the subsequent 
persistently anaemic recovery, but also by the unbalanced post-crisis policy-mix, 
which has left the task to manage this burden to the monetary policy. 
In the last decade, there has been a change in the position of central banks conduit, 
                                                          
1 Senior Researcher, PhD, CCFM Victor Slăvescu, Address: Calea 13 Septembrie nr.13, Casa 
Academiei, District 5, 050711 Bucharest, Romania, Tel.: +4.021.318.24.19, Fax: +4.021.318.24.19, 
e-mail: cristeadina@yahoo.com. 
2 Senior Researcher, PhD, CCFM Victor Slăvescu, Address: Calea 13 Septembrie nr.13, Casa 
Academiei, District 5, 050711 Bucharest, Romania, Tel.: +4.021.318.24.19, Fax: +4.021.318.24.19, 
e-mail: iulia_lupu@icfm.ro. 
AUDŒ, Vol. 14, no. 1/2018, pp. 33-44 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                     Vol 14, no 1, 2018 
34 
from an offensive one, driven by the important role played by these institutions in 
managing the adverse effects of the global financial crisis, to a defensive one, as an 
accommodation to the circumstances created by the complexity of the post-crisis 
challenges. 
Empirically, there is a preference for the inflation targeting strategy as a monetary 
policy strategy of most of the central banks worldwide, this being grounded on the 
theoretical level, taking into account the avoidance of temporal inconsistency, the 
importance attached to the credibility and autonomy of the monetary authority, its 
focus on the formation of inflation expectations, the technical character of the 
pursued objective, etc. 
With the global financial crisis, this strategy has often been criticized, and its 
strengths were questioned. The pressures came from those who considered that the 
inflation targeting strategy was the author of the crisis (Taylor, 2012), because it 
conferred a too eased character to the monetary policy by creating a favourable 
environment for the accumulation of imbalances in the 2000s (Borio and Lowe, 
2002), but insufficient after this moment. Others, on the other hand, consider that 
this regime is just a ―stander-by‖ of the crisis or even a ―saviour‖ of the crisis 
(Banerjee et al., 2013), meaning that the inflation targeting strategy, by anchoring 
the inflationary expectations, would reduce the severity of the financial crisis 
effects. 
The article starts from the features of the recent post-crisis period in the matter of 
monetary policy and from some observations on the inflation targeting strategy as a 
dominant monetary strategy adopted by most central banks in both developed and 
emerging countries. Based on the analysis of the reactions of these institutions to 
the problems encountered in the post-crisis period, several options are evidenced 
for central banks in order to respond to the new challenges. As an analysis period, 
the focus is on the recent post-crisis phase (after 2013), when, in most economies, 
the monetary policy has to manage the inflation’s dynamics, persistently low 
(below the optimal level, the chosen target), under the difficult conditions related to 
a narrowed room for maneuver of the conventional monetary policy, as well as to 
the uncertainty about the effects of unconventional measures applied by many 
central banks. Given that the economic activity in many countries continues to 
decline, and the period of inflation under targeting is prolonged, there is a risk of 
affecting inflation expectations. In addition, many central banks operate in an 
environment of minimum interest rates, which may affect the credibility of the 
return strategy to the medium-term inflation target for anchoring inflationary 
expectations, another challenge for the monetary policy being the decreased 
sensitivity of these expectations to inflation surprises. The unconventional 
monetary policy measures adopted after the global financial crisis triggered the 
inflationary expectations (Cloyne et al., 2016; Hofmann & Zhu, 2013), but they 
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gradually decreased, which may indicate that the more recent monetary policy 
would have been less adaptable than thought. 
 
2. Remarks on the Post-Crisis Monetary Policy Adjustments 
Although there is no consensus on the generally favourable nature of the inflation 
targeting strategy (Reichlin & Baldwin, 2013), the recent experience of central 
banks shows that it remains a valid one in the post-crisis period. The success and 
credibility of the inflation targeting regime gained before the global financial crisis 
outbreak, created a large enough space for central banks to act aggressively during 
the crisis to stimulate the economies they represented by a series of 
countermeasures for the threats to the stability of the financial system (reduction of 
monetary policy interest rates, monetary and quantitative easing measures, foreign 
exchange swap operations, reduction of minimum reserves, etc.). The monetary 
policy framework, characterized by a high level of transparency, has ensured 
clearer communication of the decision-making motivations. 
2.1. Nominal Anchor and Monetary Policy Objective 
Medium-term inflation expectations that tend to decrease in the post-crisis period 
call for a more aggressive monetary policy approach. A credible and transparent 
arrangement in the direction of a temporary increasing of the inflation target level, 
but not too high, could provide an important condition for counteracting the 
deflation and recession risks by long-term reduction of real rates, even when 
nominal interest rates are at the minimum level (zero lower bond). This would lead 
to a revival of the demand and a return of the inflation rate at the target level, in a 
shorter time. Based on this reasoning, more and more central banks recognize the 
importance of the medium-term flexible inflation targeting strategy of some central 
banks (e.g. Australia) by allowing short-term inflation fluctuations. The target 
flexibility involves overtaking it in one way or another, facilitating the anchoring 
of the inflationary expectations in the medium term and reducing the uncertainty in 
the economy. In this context, the monetary policy option is aimed at pursuing the 
faster rise in inflation, with the expectation that it will mean a temporary overrun of 
inflation, and in the future the target will be pursued to be attained from that higher 
level. The Bank of Japan has such a strategy and the expected effect would be to 
improve the debt dynamics by boosting the nominal GDP and reducing debt levels 
as a share of GDP. 
Some studies (Blanchard et al., 2010; Krugman, 2014) propose the shifting of the 
inflation target above 2% level, as an option to change the inflation target, thus 
giving the central bank the opportunity to introduce more incentives when needed. 
In theory, moving the inflation target to a higher level would reduce the constraints 
on the minimum interest rate threshold, but the benefits of a greater flexibility 
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could be overcome or even eliminated by the risks of rising inflationary volatility 
(Kryvtsov & Mendes, 2015), and ―de-anchoring‖ of the inflationary expectations, 
thus increasing the risk of affecting the credibility of the central bank if the long-
term targets are abandoned. 
The analysis based on the annual reports of central banks indicates overall the 
maintenance of the nominal anchors and monetary policy objectives. The monetary 
policy adaptation in the post-crisis period was only slightly reflected in changes 
regarding either the nominal anchor or the monetary policy objective set out in the 
statute, and in the case of central banks that have adopted such changes, there is a 
preference for the inflation targeting strategy (see Table 1). Thus, the Bank of 
Japan adopted such an inflation targeting strategy in 2013 as part of a wider 
strategy to combat deflation (the so-called Abenomics program). 
Without changing its dual responsibility for the monetary policy objective, the US 
Federal Reserve Bank has set a numerical inflation target that, although declared, is 
not considered an explicit nominal anchor. 
Even among the emerging countries, there is a focus on the inflation targeting 
strategy. Thus, in February 2015, the Reserve Bank of India signed an agreement 
with the government that formally laid the foundations for an inflation targeting 
strategy
1
, and the central bank of the Russian Federation adopted such a strategy in 
2015. 
Table 2. Features of monetary policy during post-crisis time 
Central Bank from Nominal Anchor/Strategy 
Monetary Policy Objective (according 
to the Central Bank Statute) 
Changes at the nominal anchor level  
Czech Republic (CNB) 
inflation, CPI /FIT (since 
2008) 
Price stability, with secondary 
objectives 
United States (Fed) implicit/FIT (since 2012) 
Price stability and full employment 
(dual mandate) 
Japan (BoJ) 
inflation, CPI /IT (since 
2013) 
Price stability 
Russia (CBRF) 
inflation, CPI /IT (since 
2015) 
Currency stability 
India (RBI) 
inflation, CPI /IT (since 
2016) 
Price stability 
No changes at the nominal anchor level 
Canada (BoC) inflation, CPI /FIT Preserving the value of money and price 
stability 
Australia (RBA) inflation, CPI /IT Preserving the value of money, full 
employment and welfare (multiple 
objectives) 
                                                          
1 In June 2016, India formally adopted a flexible inflation targeting strategy, declaring the price 
stability (based on the CPI inflation target) as the primary objective of the monetary policy. 
ISSN: 2065-0175                                                                                              ŒCONOMICA 
37 
New Zeeland (RBNZ) inflation, CPI /FIT Price stability 
Norway (NB) inflation, CPI /FIT Price stability 
United Kingdom (BoE) inflation, CPI /IT Price stability, with secondary 
objectives 
Switzerland (SNB) implicit, inflation, CPI Price stability, with secondary 
objectives 
Sweden (SRB) inflation, CPI /FIT Price stability 
Euro Area (ECB) implicit/ non-IT Price stability, with secondary 
objectives 
Denmark (DNB) exchange rate /ERT Price stability 
Brazil (CBB) inflation, CPI Domestic purchasing power 
Mexic (BoM) inflation, CPI Domestic purchasing power 
South Africa (SARB) inflation, CPI Currency stability 
Turkey (CBRT) inflation, CPI Price stability 
Poland (NBP) inflation, CPI Price stability, with secondary 
objectives 
Romania (NBR) inflation, CPI Price stability 
Hungary (MNB) inflation, CPI Price stability 
Sources: Authors’ compilation based on up-to-date information from the central banks 
websites 
Notes: CPI=consumer price index; IT=inflation targeting; FIT=forecast inflation targeting; 
ERT=exchange rate targeting. 
In recent years, an increasingly important role has been given to the economic 
forecasts, and this concern is also found in monetary policy strategies. Generally, 
inflation targeting central banks have been producing for a long time forecasts of 
inflation and output gap, but there are not many central banks that have 
reformulated their monetary policy strategy to capitalize on their own forecasts. 
They have an inflation-forecast targeting strategy. Unlike the common inflation 
targeting strategy, the inflation-forecast targeting strategy better describes the 
behaviour of the central banks that have a dual mandate and with a flexible 
inflation target, focusing on their own forecasts of inflation and the actions that 
they propose to follow to bring inflation back to the target in case it deviates. The 
central banks that adopted the forecasted inflation targeting use forecasting models 
to explain how they adjust their instruments to meet their inflation-output target. 
Therefore, the mandate of the central bank, whether explicit or implicit, is shared 
between these two objectives: although inflation control is the primary objective, 
another major objective is the output growth stability, especially under the 
conditions of the minimum interest rate threshold, and significant risks of lowering 
the long-term inflation expectations. The advantage of such a monetary policy 
strategy is, among other things, to provide more flexibility in achieving the target, 
given the wider spectrum regarding the central bank’s actions, and this flexibility is 
all the more important in the context of a limited room for manoeuvre of the 
monetary policy rate. In the post-crisis period, the Fed has adopted such a strategy 
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(since 2012), and the Czech National Bank has improved it with the detailed 
disclosure of its forecasts, including the monetary policy rate (since 2008). 
The credibility of the monetary policy decisions is also an important support for 
predicting inflation targeting as it may be easier to set the market expectations in 
the direction pursued by the central bank. This feature underpinned the adjustments 
made by central banks in Canada, the Czech Republic and the US to the 
instruments used to achieve the inflation target (exchange rate, forward guidance,  
quantitative easing). In the case of the Bank of Canada, the credibility regarding 
the inflation-forecast targeting strategy has successfully led to the successful 
depreciation of the national currency since 2014 to mitigate the impact of falling 
commodity prices on economic activity. (Clinton et al., 2015) The Czech National 
Bank pursued the depreciation of the national currency by capping the koruna 
exchange rate to euro in order to eliminate the risk of deflation, and the Fed, by 
quantitative easing and forward guidance measures since the adoption of projected 
inflation targeting, maintained long-term inflation expectations anchored at the 2% 
target. 
One of the key elements of this strategy is the forecasting of an endogenous 
trajectory of the short-term interest rate and the anticipation of inflationary 
expectations. Central banks which have such instruments are those of Canada, the 
Czech Republic, New Zealand and Sweden. This type of strategy has the 
attributions needed to respond to post-crisis challenges, especially since recent 
research, such as that made by Gaspar et al. (2016), shows that inflation 
expectations are better anchored in the medium-term, in countries with an inflation-
forecast targeting strategy, providing a stable basis for meeting the monetary policy 
objective. 
Besides the option of the inflation-forecast targeting strategy, which is in fact a 
reinterpretation of the nominal anchor flexibility and involves the development of 
the technical forecasting and communication apparatus, there is also the option of 
integrated inflation targeting framework by including the financial stability policy 
in the monetary policy strategy. (Criste & Lupu, 2014) This option derives from 
the need to take into account the objective of financial stability as a result of the 
link between the dynamics of real interest rates and the global financial cycle, a 
relationship highlighted by Borio and Zabai (2016) and by Juselius et al. (2016). 
Starting from the presumption that the financial developments are at the core of the 
economic fluctuations, whether they lead to a crisis or not, a monetary policy 
oriented towards financial stability would be the one that permanently takes into 
account, i.e. throughout the entire financial cycle, this objective. Based on the 
integrated inflation targeting, a solution proposed by Agénor and Pereira da Silva 
(2013), and Pereira da Silva (2016), the central bank responsibility is explicitly 
extended in order to include the objective of financial stability, the interest rate is 
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set as to directly and clearly respond to an excessive credit growth, and also the 
macroprudential measures are directed as to meet both, the price stability and the 
financial stability. However, the problem consists of combining and measuring the 
three types of policy instruments: the conventional and unconventional measures of 
monetary policy, and the macroprudential ones, specific to the financial stability 
policy. 
 
3. Monetary Policy Tools 
In order to adjust the monetary policy strategy in the post-crisis period, most 
changes were made at the level of monetary policy instruments, both in terms of 
widening the range (diversification by applying non-conventional instruments) and 
increasing the intensity of their use. The literature analysing the set of instruments 
used in the post-crisis time is abundant. Some studies focus on the definition and 
classification of unconventional monetary policy measures (Borio & Disyatat, 
2009; Cecioni et al., 2011), other studies either describe the impact of these 
unconventional measures at the macroeconomic level (Lenza et al, 2010; IMF, 
2013), or investigate the challenges emerging from the unconventional measures 
implementation (Shirai, 2014), and also the limits of their application. (Peersman, 
2013) Borio and Zabai (2016) update the information on the application of 
unconventional monetary policy and consider that these measures should be 
regarded as exceptional ones, used in special situations, given not only the unclear 
results of their effectiveness in influencing the financial market variables (bond 
yields, asset prices, exchange rates), but also the difficulties of assessing their 
impact on production and inflation, and the uncertainty of their long-term effects 
considering the central bank’s objectives and independence. 
The narrowing room for manoeuvre of the policy interest rate, and also the need to 
support the quantitative and qualitative easing measures applied by central banks of 
the advanced economies have entailed to a stronger communication between the 
central bank and the market by the forward guidance policy in order to keep the 
interest rate expectations at a lower level for a certain period of time. Central banks 
applying the forward guidance since the early post-crisis stage (Fed, Bank of 
Sweden) were joined by others: Bank of Japan, Bank of England, European Central 
Bank and Czech National Bank (see Table 2). 
In addition to the traditional ways of communication and the new ones (forward 
guidance), with a growing frequency, the central banks communicate with the 
market through price and production forecasts, in order to reduce the uncertainty 
and any mistakes in predicting and interpreting future policies by the public. As we 
have already mentioned, some central banks apply an advanced monetary policy 
strategy by publishing the trajectory of the endogenous interest rate, along with the 
forecasts of several macroeconomic variables. Thereby, it provides more 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                     Vol 14, no 1, 2018 
40 
information on how the financial assets returns are better aligned with the policy 
objectives, and also it clarifies the concrete implications of the data dependent 
policy. According to Alichi et al. (2015), the financial markets have a better 
adaptation to the post-crisis realities in countries where the central bank 
communicate the forecasted trajectory of the endogenous interest rate, based on a 
suitable forecasting model. Such a measure have been recently adopted by the 
Czech National Bank, namely, in 2008, it begun to publish the forecasted path of 
the endogenous interest rate, with confidence bands. This is a sophisticated form of 
the forward guidance policy, in line with the basic principles of the inflation 
targeting strategy, increasing the monetary policy transparency and providing a 
more concrete (numerical) version of the expected interest rate path. Such a 
decision came not only as a result of the post-crisis challenges, such as the 
achievement of the minimum interest rate threshold (zero lower bound level), but 
also of the fact that the Czech National Bank is well advanced in terms of 
macroeconomic forecasts. 
Table 2. Central banks using unconventional instruments of monetary policy
*) 
Central Banks from 
Types of unconventional tools of monetary policy 
Quantitative 
easing 
Qualitative 
easing 
Exchange 
rate 
Forward 
guidance 
Negative 
interest rate 
United States (Fed)      
Japan (BoJ)      
Czech Republic (CNB)      
United Kingdom (BoE)      
Switzerland (SNB)      
Sweden (SRB)      
Euro Area (ECB)      
Denmark (DNB)      
*) As we’ve mentioned, the period we refer to is after 2013. Before 2013, several central banks of the 
emerging economies (especially from Eastern Europe) used the so-called unconventional monetary 
policy (see Criste, 2015). Also, some central banks of the emerging economies are still using a kind of 
unconventional monetary instruments (e.g. reserve requirements), but they are different from those 
considered in this article. 
Limiting the room for the interest rate manoeuvres in a recessionary environment 
could determine central banks to use the exchange rate as an unconventional 
monetary policy instrument, given that, when the classic nominal interest rate 
adjustment mechanism is no longer valid, the real interest rate and the real 
exchange rate channels could be activated on the expected inflation base. Using the 
exchange rate as an additional instrument for the monetary policy strategy implies 
an intense and credible communication of the central bank with the market. Such a 
measure has been also adopted by the Czech National Bank, since the end of 2013, 
in order to influence the medium-term expectations, considering the exchange rate 
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as a shock absorber for the recession. The intensive communication and the higher 
credibility of the Czech National Bank have been effective (Criste, 2015), because 
the participants in the financial market understood from the central bank’s 
messages that the monetary policy does not seek to fix the exchange rate, but to 
stimulate the economic activity, to increase inflation and to reduce the risk of 
deflation. 
An important role for using the exchange rate as an unconventional tool for 
influencing the market expectations has also the structure of the economy. For an 
economy with a higher degree of openness, the effects of the exchange rate 
depreciation on the demand, inflation, and expected inflation are much higher than 
those registered for a less open economy. The size of the economy is also 
important; the use of exchange rate instrument does not entail major effects in 
terms of the beggar-thy-neighbour policy on a smaller economy than on a larger 
one. 
Some central banks (European Central Bank, National Bank of Sweden), 
concerned about the risks to economic growth and deflation, have adopted the 
negative interest rate policy, in order to discourage the banks and credit institutions 
from their proclivity towards holding their excess reserves at the central bank and 
also to stimulate the lending activity. Other central banks instead have begun to 
apply negative interest rates to counteract the pressures from both the national 
currency appreciation and the capital inflow (Denmark National Bank, National 
Bank of Switzerland). However, it is difficult to assess the effects of negative 
interest rates, at least because there are several factors which influence the external 
demand. Negative interest rates may cause national currency depreciations by 
providing incentives for capital transfers to higher yielding economies, but this 
tendency could be mitigated by a possible higher inflation or inflation expectations. 
On the other side, the incentive effect of the negative interest rates on the aggregate 
demand, and on the asset prices increasing increase in real terms could offset the 
national currency depreciation. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The nominal anchor and monetary policy objectives have not undergone major 
changes, but it is worth noting that unlike in the early stage of the post-crisis, the 
criticism of inflation targeting has gradually improved its reputation, not only 
because those central banks which had such a strategy did not abandon it, but 
because other central banks have also adopted recently such a strategy (Fed, Bank 
of Japan, Reserve Bank of India and Bank of Russia). 
During post-crisis time, it is noticed an increasing relevance for the inflation-
forecast targeting strategy, as it can more easily guide the market expectations in 
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the direction pursued by the central bank, but it implies a high level of credibility 
of the central bank’s policy. 
The adjustment of the monetary policy strategy during post-crisis time mainly 
meant changes at the level of monetary instruments. As a rule, the central banks, 
constrained by circumstances, have improved the communication tools and 
techniques, giving a greater importance to developing and publishing 
macroeconomic forecasts. In this post-crisis stage, characterized by a higher 
uncertainty for the future development of the economic activity, we believe that, 
among the instruments at the central banks’ disposal, the communication policy 
becomes one of the most essential monetary policy tool, especially, because it can 
contribute to anticipate the public reactions. In addition to the classical 
communication methods, the forward guidance policy is increasingly important, as 
well as communicating the forecasts of various macroeconomic variables 
(inflation, the potential GDP, endogenous interest rate, etc.). For several central 
banks, the forward guidance policy tends to become a standard and permanent 
instrument of policy framework, in the post-crisis time, although the transmission 
mechanism of this decision and its effects are not yet sufficiently studied and 
known. The persistently low inflation in most economies, below the optimum level 
(i.e. the target), represents a further challenge for the monetary policy strategy, as 
this persistence is reflected on the inflationary expectations, which could lead 
further to a ―de-anchoring‖ of them. Bringing the inflationary expectations to the 
sustainable path (followed by the central bank) represents a future challenge for 
monetary policy. It requires, among other things, an improvement in the 
communication policy, and also in the developing and public dissemination of the 
forecasts for the macroeconomic and financial variables, in order to achieve a 
better guiding of the public and to improve the anticipations regarding the 
economic developments. 
Based on the literature proposals concerning the monetary policy strategy, and also 
on the experience of some central bank which have adapted their monetary policies 
to the crisis and post-crisis challenges, we believe that, although there is not a valid 
universal solution, the monetary policy strategies can be adjusted taking into 
account the features of both the forecast-inflation targeting strategy and the 
integrated inflation targeting strategy. The latter one implies to explicitly extend 
the central bank’s responsibility by including the financial stability objective into 
the monetary policy strategy. 
As regards the option for an integrated inflation targeting strategy, a further 
challenge for the monetary policy is to design a rule that takes into account both, 
the financial developments and the contribution to the mitigation of the financial 
cycle. Such a rule entails reorienting the monetary policy strategy towards the 
financial stability objective, but not in a narrow sense, namely adopting a proactive 
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conduct to counteract the accumulation of the financial imbalances only when they 
become obvious, but in a broader one, by taking into account the financial 
developments in a systematic manner, so as not to deviate too long and too far from 
what it is called ―financial balance‖. 
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